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Abstract 
 
In the last decade, the private sector has increased its role in the highways 
sector both through the construction and management of new assets. 
Private sector involvement, often justified by the need to ease public 
expenditure, allows a reduction in public participation for new investments. 
The public sector remains in charge of other important issues such as 
regulation, but privatization entails the transfer of a natural monopoly to 
another subject with completely different objectives compared with the 
public operator.  
The present work wants to analyse the highway privatization processes in 
Italy and Japan focusing on the two approaches and on their differences; 
the paper tries to evaluate the policies applied and their consequences on 
the general economic well – being according to a public economics 
viewpoint. Italy implemented a real privatization process (even if some 
regulatory issues have risen) while Japan still faces a strong public 
presence.  
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Introduction 
 
At the end of 1999 in Italy the former public company Autostrade was 
privatized. Few years later (2005) also Japan carried out a privatization 
programme of its expressway network. In both cases the main trigger for 
the privatization was the huge public debt faced by the two nations and the 
need to collect resources from the sale of the profitable motorway 
networks. 
It thus seems worth to analyse and compare the two processes, 
underlining similarities and differences and trying to evaluate the 
consequences on the general economic well-being according to a public 
economics viewpoint. 
The paper is structured as follows: in the first part the concept of natural 
monopoly with regard to the highway sector will be shortly discussed, then 
few significant information about the two nations will be provided. In the 
second part we will discuss the two privatization processes then in the last 
part of the paper we will provide some final remarks about the privatization 
processes.    
 
1. Highways and Natural Monopolies 
 
The concept of natural monopoly has been deeply analysed in literature, 
here we will shortly point out its main characteristics and implications.  
Road networks, in particular the highways, are fundamental national 
assets that can influence the competitiveness of a country and influence 
national welfare. Highways are natural monopolies, mainly because they 
usually require large fixed investments that make the duplication of those 
assets not reasonable because generating a welfare loss.  
High investments implies that it is cheaper (for the society) to let a 
single firm produce the whole output, rather than divide the production 
among different firms (Stiglitz, 2000). The most recent definition of natural 
monopoly considers the concept of cost subadditivity for which a firm is a 
natural monopoly in a market if no more than one firm can serve the 
market and receive non-negative profits3.  
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The most relevant implication of natural monopoly concerns the risk of 
exploitation of market power in particularly whereas travellers cannot 
choose an alternative mode that is time and price competitive to the same 
destination (Fielding and Klein, 1993). In fact the monopolist can set the 
price above the marginal cost of production of the last unit of output 
(Biggar, 2008), causing a reduction in social welfare (deadweight loss). 
In order to avoid this inefficient outcome two approaches are possible, 
the first one entails the direct provision by the government while the 
alternative would be to franchise the asset to private operator regulated by 
an independent agency. Historically highways have been financed, built 
and managed by the public sector since they were considered public goods.  
In the last decades the involvement of the private sector has increased a lot 
worldwide both trough PPP initiative and privatization of former public 
highways. 
The reasons behind these opposite decisions are, in the former case, 
mainly the greater efficiency attributable to the private operator while the 
latter derives from the necessity of assuring financial resources to reduce 
national deficit. 
In fact most privatization in the European nations issued from the need 
to respect the financial restriction imposed by Maastricht Treaty; this 
implied a strong reduction in public spending in order to cap public debt.   
  In the next paragraphs we will discuss Japan’s and Italy’s ways to 
privatization of highways in order to evaluate the two approaches.    
 
2. General comparison between Japan and Italy  
 
We present here a short overview aimed at evidencing the similarities of 
the contexts in which the two highway systems are placed.  
Japan and Italy present some common aspects ranging from territorial 
characteristics (both are mountainous and of similar shape) to some issues 
related to the economic development (Molteni, 2002). Japan’s land area is 
slightly larger than Italian one while the total population is about 46% 
larger. Concerning the highway extension the main difference between the 
two countries regards the age of the network since most of Italian highways 
were built 30 to 40 years ago (Greco, 2005), while in Japan only 57% of the 
present network were opened by 1985 (Tomoyuki, 2009).   
 
Tab.1: Data Comparison 
 
Nation ITALY JAPAN 
Total Area (thousand km2) 301 378 
Population (thousand) 58,126 127,078 
Density (people/km2) 200 337 
Urban Population (of total) 68% 66% 
Highway Extension (thousand) * 5,694 9,200 
Traffic Volume (million pax-km/year) ** 823.5 913.6 
Public Debt (% of GDP) 115.2 192.1 
Average unit toll (€/km) *** ~ 0.06 ~ 0.2 
 
Source: CIA, The World Fact Book, 2009 
 * World Bank, Excerpt Highway Financing in India, 2007,  Aiscat, Aiscat in cifre,2008 
** ITF, Annual Data, 2008 - Total road transport (private cars + buses and coaches) 
*** Ragazzi, 2005 and Mizutani, 2006 
The most relevant aspect common to both the nations is probably the 
huge public debt; according to the most recent classification that considers 
public debt as percentage of GDP, Japan and Italy rank, respectively, at the 
second and seventh position in the world. We may say that the two public 
debts had different origins; for the Italian case it is the result of wrong 
policies applied within a context of strong political interference where the 
primary objective was to accommodate the requests of the constituencies 
(Molteni, 2002). In the case of Japan, national debt has increased in the late 
1980s because of falling tax revenues (Molteni, 2002) and of  various 
spending increases to overcome the recession. 
 
3. The privatization process in Italy 
 
In the last decade, the Italian highway industry has undertaken a significant 
privatization process that changed not only the ownership of most of the 
concessions holders but also the regulatory framework (Benfratello et al, 
2005). In the following paragraphs we will firstly discuss the history of 
Autostrade and then we will present the privatization path. 
 
 
 
3.1 Road to privatization 
 
Autostrade Concessioni e Costruzioni was established in 1950 inside the 
government – owned holding group IRI (Istituto per la Ricostruzione 
Industriale); six years later, Autostrade and ANAS (the national agency for 
roads) signed the first Agreement for the construction and management of 
the highway link between Milan and Naples. Italy’s highway network grew 
very quickly until 1975 (Greco, 2004), Autostrade played a major role since 
during the years was granted several concessions while the other 
concessionaires were awarded concessions for single route per company. 
In 1968 Anas and Autostrade signed a new agreement which foresaw 
that by the end of 2003, the whole network should have been given back to 
the State (Ragazzi, 2008). Until 1975, when the construction of new 
highways was stopped by the law 492/1975 due to the petrol crisis that 
caused a deep slump in the highway sector, Italy’s network accounted 
about 5000 km, one of the longest in Europe.     
Between 1982 and 19874 the public Autostrade increased its role in the 
highways sector acquiring financially troubled concessionaires and 
obtaining new concessions in exchange of the extension of the concession 
period to the end of 20185. 
During the 90s, due to the high national public debt, the critical financial 
condition of IRI and the strict constrains imposed by the Maastricht Treaty 
for the integration of the EU, Italy launched a considerable programme of 
privatization aimed at dismantling the public holding IRI.  
The sale of Autostrade’s shares was held in two stages. The first phase  
was between June and October 1999 (ASPI, 2007), when 30% of shares 
were sold to a stable core of shareholders, Schema28 spa, a  company 
controlled by the Benetton family6. The second stage was in December 
1999 when the remaining shares were listed on the stock market.  
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  To date Schema28 holds a 50.1% stake of the company 
 Fig. 1 Autostrade network7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
        
 
              
 
 
3.2 Ex post considerations  
 
Concerning the first phase of the privatization, it is important to notice 
that there was only a group (“Schema28 S.p.A.”) that made the final offer, 
this mainly because of the complexity of the clauses present in the 
convention and the high political risk of the investment (Ragazzi, 2008). 
Another relevant aspect concerns the new Agreement drafted between 
Anas and Autostrade SpA just before the privatization; this was the 
occasion to extend again the concession period from 2018 to 2038. The 
new convention was signed in 1997 and it foresaw the application of CIPE8 
Directive n.219/1996 that introduced price cap method to adjust tolls.  The 
mechanism defined toll increases as follows: 
 
QXPT β+∆−∆≤∆  
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where ∆T is the change in toll rate (weighted average for the entire 
network of each concessionaire), ∆P is the projected rate of inflation, X is 
the expected increase in productivity, β∆Q is the factor related to the 
quality of service (measured by the structural  state of paving and the 
accident rate). 
There is a widespread belief that it was a price cap only in name due to 
a series of flaws that compromised the whole mechanism, making the 
investment very profitable (Beria and Ponti, 2009). First of all the scarce 
transparency in the interpretation of the X parameter (Ragazzi, 2006) that 
entailed wide discretional powers to ANAS with high level of negotiation; 
moreover the value of this parameter in the different years was set 
identically for 9 (out of 20) concessionaires (Benfratello et al., 2005). The 
choice to assign the traffic risk to the concessionaire did not consider that 
traffic growth depends mainly on a series of variable (fuel price, 
macroeconomic condition, modal alternatives, etc) that are outside the 
control of the licensee; this aspect together with ANAS “prudent” traffic 
forecasts seem to have offered a wide opportunity for extra profits 
(Ragazzi, 2006).  
Finally, the absence of the “claw back” of profits represented the main 
flaw of the Italian price cap scheme since claw back foresees that at the end 
of the regulatory period, the extra profits gained by the concessionaire 
thanks to the increased efficiency in productivity should be transferred to 
the users in tariff. Today profits are collected entirely by the 
concessionaire. 
According to Ragazzi (2006), tolls should have been abolished at the 
end of the 90s or lowered to cover the operating costs, because the network 
was built 30 – 40 years ago thus it was completely amortized. The new 
Agreement, signed just before the privatization within the extension of the 
concession period, aimed at maximizing the selling price (Ragazzi, 2006), 
in practice the State sold the future cash flow with high actualized rate in 
order to attract private investors (Greco, 2004).  
The common rationale that justifies privatization is that private actor can 
achieve greater efficiency than public, this mainly because privatization 
entails competition. In the case of Autostrade seems that no efficiency 
motivation was carried to justify the privatization.  
The new Single Concession Agreement signed on 12th October 2007 and 
in effect from 8th June 2008, following the approval of Law 101/2008 
foresees a shift from the former conditions defined in the previous 
convention. The modifications entail a new formula for tariff adjustments 
and the revision of the claw back idea. Concerning the first point, the 
formula for calculating the annual adjustment of toll charges has been 
modified as follows:  
 
 
 
The new simplified formula, which lasts for the full term of the agreement, 
considers a fixed percentage (70%) of the real inflation rate, plus specific 
tariff components for work performed that were not included in the original 
1997 agreement (X parameter)9 and  for new  investments (K parameter)10. 
According to the Agreement, the adjustments are to be prorated to the 
actual stage of completion of works. The most significant difference 
between these two formula is the different function of the X parameter that 
in the former expression represented the efficiency gains achievable 
(defined every five years between the concessionaire and the grantor) 
during the regulatory lag; more precisely, the new concession still foresees 
the X parameter that now has a purely accounting function.  
Concerning the new formula and in particular the absence of the claw back, 
the Italian Antitrust Authority, has strongly criticised this new normative 
framework (July 4th, 2008), underlining that it makes not possible to verify 
the productivity performance of the concessionaire in the regulatory 
period, to regularly review the charges and to reallocate to the users 
portion of any benefits arising from productivity gains, which are bound to 
turn into monopoly rents.  
 
4. The privatization process in Japan 
 
On October 1st, 2005, Japan completed the privatization of four highway 
related public corporations that became six expressway companies. In the 
next paragraph we will discuss the path that lead to the privatization.  
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4.1 Highway framework 
 
Japanese highway system started to grow in the aftermath of the Second 
World War when the nation had to face the reconstruction and the 
improvement of the road network in order to stimulate industrialisation and 
economic growth. During the 50s a series of law were enacted to tackle the 
problem, these laws marked the establishment of a different road policy 
that shifted from the view that roads should be free, to the idea that a toll 
system was needed in order to repay the maintenance and expansion of the 
road network (Mizutani, 2006). Between 1956 and 1970, several public 
companies were established to construct and manage the highway network: 
 
• Japan Highway Public Corporation; 
• Metropolitan Expressway Public Corporation; 
• Hanshin Expressway Public Corporation; 
• Honshu - Shikoku Bridge Autority. 
 
Japan Highway Public Corporation (hereafter JH) was a non-profit 
government corporation with a leading role in Japan’s highway 
development.  Japanese road network was realized in three phases: the first 
one between 1950s and 1960s focused on the main trunk lines, in the next 
decade five longitudinal lines were constructed then from the latter half of 
the 1980s transversal links were built (Kimura and Maeda, 2005). 
The 90s saw a decline in the performance of JH due in part to new 
routes planned in the latter half of the 1980s that entailed high construction 
costs with relatively small traffic and in part to the economic recession 
occurred in the latter half of the 90s (Kimura and Maeda, 2005). 
At the end of 2003 JH debts reached 2,070 billion yen (about 14.3 
billion Euro; Mizutani, 2006), this was the main reason that lead to the 
privatization. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2 Japanese network (Source Morichi, 2007) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
In the next paragraph we will shortly present the pricing method that 
allowed the construction of the Japanese network. 
 
4.2. Pricing system 
 
Japan’s pricing system is characterized by two peculiarities: the full 
repayment principle and the toll pooling system. 
The first one foresees that total toll revenues during a pre fixed period of 
time must cover the total cost of the construction of the highways, 
including land acquisition, operation, maintenance, financing costs and 
others.  
With the toll pooling system toll revenues from each route are pooled 
together and used for the repayment of the entire national expressway 
system. Then the same level of toll is applied on the whole network, its 
value is defined by equalising total revenues from all routes for a set of 
time period to total costs of highways (Mizutani, 2006). The rationale for 
the system considers different aspects (World Bank, 1999) like the view 
that (i) cross subsidization facilitates network expansion and the 
construction of costly parts of the network deemed essential for the network 
as a whole, (ii) profitability of some routes is improved by the opening of 
connecting routes, etc.  
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3 Pricing system 
 
 
 
It is important to say that thanks to this mechanism, Japanese network 
increased greatly, particularly whereas the construction of routes was less 
profitable due to lower demand and/or higher construction costs (World 
Bank, 1999); on the other hand this system may have caused very high toll 
levels.   
 
4.3. From public to private? 
 
In 2005 the four highway public corporations in Japan were privatized 
as part of reform spearheaded by Prime Minister Koizumi. At the end of 
2001, Koizumi Government decided to reorganize and privatize four 
highway-related corporations; the decision on a number of matters and the 
reform plan was referred to the “Committee for Promoting Privatization of 
Four Highway related Public Corporations”. The Committee discussed 
many issues, for example whether to proceed with the privatization of the 
existing four public corporation as a single unit or as separate units, the 
expensive toll level, the huge debt accumulated by the corporations, the 
extra costs due to the Corporation’s family companies, etc.    
In October 2005 privatization took place with the establishment of six 
new commercial companies (Central NEXCO, West NEXCO, East 
NEXCO, Honshu – Shikoku Bridge Expressway Company Ltd., 
Metropolitan Expressway Company Ltd., Hanshin Expressway Company 
Ltd.) along with an independent administrative agency, the Japanese 
Expressway Holding and Debt repayment Agency (JEHDRA), owned by 
the Japanese government.  
Fig. 4 Privatization framework (Source JEHDRA) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Three were the objectives of the privatization (JEHDRA, 2009): 
- Secure repayment of interest-bearing debts, amounting to 40 trillion 
yen (336 billion Euro); 
- Construction, without delay, of genuinely needed expressways with a 
minimum burden on the general public, while paying due respect to 
autonomy of the Companies; 
- Offering of diverse and flexible prices and services by utilizing the 
private sector’s know-how. 
 
4.4.  Japanese highways reorganization 
 
According to the recommendations of the Committee’s final report, a 
new organization (JEHDRA) was founded in order to reduce the financial 
burden for highways companies and to support the successful 
implementation of highway services. JEHDRA holds highway facilities and 
leases them to expressway companies; its objectives (JEHDRA, 2009) are 
to secure the repayment within 45 years of the debts inherited from former 
public corporations and the new debt determined by the six private 
operators in order to extend the network, the second role is to exercise legal 
authority on behalf of road administrators in order to secure proper 
management and maintenance of the highways. Finally JEHDRA’s last 
function is to enhance the transparency and disclosure of information about  
the projects. The Agency owns both expressway already constructed and 
the new assets; the lease fees paid by the Companies are equal to tolls 
received minus the expressway maintenance and management costs so the 
private operator can only make profit from business activities related to 
expressways such as rest area operations (restaurant, gas station, etc).  
 Fig. 5 Interaction between JEHDRA and Companies (Source JEHDRA) 
 
 
4.5 Ex post considerations 
 
As stated above, the main rationale for the privatization of public 
corporations was the huge amount of debt accumulated during the years for 
the construction of the Japanese network. Toll road projects have been 
financed mainly through four financial sources (Mizutani, 2006): 
 
• Toll revenues; 
• Highway bonds; 
• Loans from banks; 
• Government subsidies and social capital fund. 
 
Bonds have been the most important tool used to finance highway 
expansion; two types of government guaranteed bonds (World Bank, 1999) 
were provided through the  Fiscal Investment and Loan Program11 (FILP, 
also translated as Treasury Investment and Loan), Government Acceptance 
Bonds and Government Guaranteed Bonds. The first type of bonds are 
purchased by the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Posts and 
Telecommunications with funds from sources such as postal savings 
accounts,  employee pension funds, national pension funds, etc while 
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and the creation of JEHDRA whose primarily role is the repayment of the 
debt.  
 
 
Fig. 5 Public sector – JEHDRA – Private Companies  
 
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Highways in Japan face a strong public presence trough JEHDRA and, 
in general, the Government that guarantees the majority of the bonds 
issued. JEHDRA provides also interest-free loans financed with subsidies 
granted by the national government or local public entities, besides the 
Agency can subsidize the Companies to facilitate a reduction in cost for  
the construction, maintenance and management in general (JEHDRA, 
2009).   
Concerning the private involvement we may say that it is very limited 
since the shares of the six joint-stock companies are mostly controlled by 
the public sector. The common rationale to involve the private sector is that 
it entails more efficiency and a better service then the public. In Japan the 
private presence seems only formal, the pricing system does not encourage 
the companies to be more efficient, innovative or to implement commercial 
campaigns to attract more users (Mizutani, 2006) since expressway 
companies do not make any profit from toll operation. Moreover because 
JEHDRA has to take over all roads built by the new companies, as well as 
the debts newly incurred by them, efficiency and cost reduction becomes 
unlikely. Finally, the private sector should have been involved through 
competitive tendering in order to introduce incentives towards efficiency. 
 
5. Final remarks 
 
This paper aimed at analyzing two different approaches to the 
privatization; in general, there seem to be less similarities between the two 
cases than one would expect, in particular considering that both processes 
started with the same aim of reducing the huge national public debt.  
The analysis seems to underline that the privatization of formerly public 
highways network is a very complicated process: the Italian case presents 
difficulties in the public economic regulation, with particular respect to the 
limitations of extra-profits, while the Japanese process does not seem to 
have reached his objective (the reduction of public debt). 
In Italy the privatization has been completed and the national 
government has somehow reached his objective, by earning 6.7 billion 
Euros and giving 1.7 billion Euros of debt away (Corte dei Conti, 2010). 
However, the analysis of the results rises many doubts about the socio-
economical convenience of the whole operation, in particular with respect 
to the current high level of tolls and the mechanisms related to new 
investments (Corte dei Conti, 2010; Beria and Ponti, 2009; Ragazzi, 2008). 
However, an improvement in the quality and safety of the privatized 
network is generally reckoned (ASPI, 2007). 
In Japan, instead, the intentions to privatize the highways network seem 
to have somehow diverted toward a new organization which still assigns a 
major role to the public sector that can determine and influence the 
motorway sector leaving scarce room for the private presence. The actual 
framework that does not clearly separate public and private interests, risks 
and responsibilities, affects and does not bring out the real benefits that 
privatization could entail. Accordingly, the term “privatization” seems at 
least inadequate since very little seem to have changed in the management 
of the highways. 
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